Getting the picture: iconicity does not affect representation-referent confusion. by Wimmer, MC et al.
Getting the Picture: Iconicity Does Not Affect
Representation-Referent Confusion
Marina C. Wimmer1*, Elizabeth J. Robinson2, Laura Koenig1, Emma Corder3
1 University of Plymouth, School of Psychology, Cognition Centre, Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2 University of Warwick, Department of Psychology, Coventry, United
Kingdom, 3 Oxford Brookes University, School of Psychology, Oxford, United Kingdom
Abstract
Three experiments examined 3- to 5-year-olds’ (N = 428) understanding of the relationship between pictorial iconicity
(photograph, colored drawing, schematic drawing) and the real world referent. Experiments 1 and 2 explored pictorial
iconicity in picture-referent confusion after the picture-object relationship has been established. Pictorial iconicity had no
effect on referential confusion when the referent changed after the picture had been taken/drawn (Experiment 1) and when
the referent and the picture were different from the outset (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated whether children are
sensitive to iconicity to begin with. Children deemed photographs from a choice of varying iconicity representations as best
representations for object reference. Together, findings suggest that iconicity plays a role in establishing a picture-object
relation per se but is irrelevant once children have accepted that a picture represents an object. The latter finding may
reflect domain general representational abilities.
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Introduction
Pictures are ubiquitous features in our lives. They provide both
children and adults with information about objects and events with
which they are unfamiliar, have not experienced directly, and
perhaps never will experience. Is this the leaf of a birch or a beech
tree? How do the planets lie in relation to each other? What did
dinosaurs look like? When adults interpret pictures in such
circumstances, they have no difficulty treating them as represen-
tations of something. The unthinking assumption of parents and
teachers is probably that children share this adult conception of
pictures. They may focus on whether or not a child can identify
what a picture shows, without giving thought to just how the child
construes the relationship between the picture and its real (or
imagined) referent. Yet as summarised below, there is evidence of
surprising errors, sufficient to suggest that many 3-year-olds,
despite being adept at interpreting the content of pictures, do not
yet hold an adult-like understanding of pictures as representations.
Evidence for representational deficits comes from studies demon-
strating that 3-year-olds have difficulty to infer a hidden object’s
location in a room from a picture/map/model [1,2,3,4,5] and
their confusions between what is shown on the picture (e.g., a doll
with a star sticker) and how the referent looks like here and now
(i.e., doll with a butterfly sticker) [6,7,8]. The aim of the current
research was to examine why picture-object referential confusions
emerge in 3- to 5-year-old children.
One sign of failure fully to understand the representational
relationship between pictures/models and their referents is 2- and
3-year-olds’ poor handling of geometric correspondences between
objects in real spaces and their picture/model representations in
order to infer a hiding location [1,2,3,4,5]. However, in these tasks
the relationship between a picture and (e.g.) a hiding location is
arbitrary; children do not have to understand why the two spaces
correspond. That is, at the beginning of these experiments
children are usually informed and given ample opportunity to
learn that objects in the picture are in the corresponding location
in the other (real) space. In contrast, the relationship between a
picture and what it represents in real life is not arbitrary.
Moreover, theoretically, an understanding of correspondence does
not require children to understand that one represents another
[9,10]. In particular, matching is unlike representing (e.g., in
neighbouring terraced houses matching room arrangements do
not imply that they represent each other) [9].
More direct evidence that 3-year-olds lack adult-like under-
standing of pictures as representations is their tendency to assume
that changes in the real referent will be accompanied by parallel
changes in the representation and vice versa [6,7,8,11,12,13,14].
For example, if a drawing is made of a teddy bear, which is
subsequently given a ribbon, children may assert that the original
drawing now bears a ribbon too [7]. Recently, these findings have
been extended and 3- and 4-year-old children match picture-
actions to changes in the real-world referent. If water is poured
over a photograph of a cotton pad, children are more likely to
select the real-world referent corresponding to the picture state
(i.e., real wet cotton pad) [6]. Thus, a false causal relationship is
ascribed to picture-object relations where action to the former has
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direct effects on the latter [6]. The aim of this research was to
examine why these picture-referent confusions occur.
Initially it has been suggested that children make picture-object
confusion errors because they have difficulty understanding
whether the experimenter wants an answer in terms of reality or
the picture [15]. However, referential confusions are only confined
to situations in which a picture represents an object [14] ruling out
an account in terms of a general misunderstanding of the reference
of the question.
An alternative explanation is that children make these errors
because they have difficulty holding in mind the picture’s features
as distinct from those of its real referent [7]. That is, children’s
referential confusions may be explained in terms of a source-
monitoring error. Source-memory refers to the ability to
distinguish between memories based on the origin of those events
[16] and develops rapidly between 4- and 6-years [17,18,19].
Children might have difficulties in remembering the source of
information, explaining picture-referent confusions.
In contrast, it has been suggested that children do not treat
photographs as static representations per se but ‘‘link’’ them to
their referents [6]. Children do not actively believe that the
referent changes in accordance with its representation rather
pictures ‘‘share properties of their referents more fluidly’’ [6].
Evidence for this account comes from the finding that children
ascribe physical changes to a picture (e.g., wetting) to a real-world
referent. It is not the case that children have difficulties in treating
features of the representation as distinct from the real-world
referent [7] but rather children incorporate changes to the
representation into the real-world-referent [6]. Thus, low-level
perceptual cues drive these confusion errors.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that children do not
simultaneously treat the current picture state as a ‘‘thing in itself’’
and a representation of an object [14,20]. That is, it is insufficient
to treat the picture either as an object in itself or to understand its
relationship to the real world scenario, something that is already
mastered at 2 years [21]. Rather, children need to understand the
representational relationship between the picture in its current
state and the real world it refers to at the time the picture was
taken. Understanding of the representational relationship between
a symbol and what it refers to appears to be domain general
[22,23]. Between 3- and 4 years children develop an understand-
ing that a pictorial stimulus such as Jastrow’s duck/rabbit [24] can
have two interpretations [23,25]. This representational pictorial
understanding is related to understanding linguistic symbols, such
as synonyms, two words can refer to one meaning (i.e., something
can be called both ‘‘bunny’’ and ‘‘rabbit’’) and homonyms, one
word can refer to two meanings (i.e., ‘‘bat’’ can be a flying
mammal and a piece of sports equipment) as well as false beliefs
[23,26,27,28]. Similarly, understanding the relation between a
current picture state and the situation it refers to may be part of
general representational development. Indeed, one sign that this is
a plausible hypothesis is the finding that referential confusions
occur for both pictures and words misrepresenting reality [14]. For
example, 3- to 4-year-olds assume that both a written name and a
picture of a sticker change in accordance to changes in the real
referent. However, these referential confusions are less likely to
occur for words than pictures [14]. Nevertheless, this finding may
indicate that representation-object referential confusions reflect
domain-general representational developments.
The current research examined which of these accounts may
best explain 3- to 5-year-olds’ representation-referent confusions
by manipulating iconicity of the representation (i.e., photograph
versus colored drawing versus schematic drawing). Iconicity refers
to the degree of picture-referent resemblance [29]. For assessing
an understanding of picture-referent relationships, methodologies
were used that are established in the literature as in Robinson et al.
[7]. It was examined whether children’s referential confusions
depend on iconicity when the referent changed after the picture
had been taken/drawn (Experiment 1) and when the referent and
the picture were different from the outset (Experiment 2). In
Experiment 3 it was investigated whether children are sensitive to
iconicity per se. To examine representational developments, the
important novelty was that different levels of iconicity (photo-
graph, colored drawing, schematic drawing) represented the same
real world referent.
The source memory account (i.e., the ability to distinguish
between memories based on the origin of those events) suggests
that the more distinctive and perceptually detailed different states
are, the better the memory and later source decision [16].
Therefore, if children suffer from difficulty holding the represen-
tation distinct from the referent then the more iconic the
representation is (i.e., degree of resemble to the real world
referent), the more likely the child is to confuse representation and
referent. If source-monitoring development accounted for refer-
ential confusion then it should be more likely to occur in
photographs than colored drawings and in turn schematic
drawings. Moreover, one would expect these errors to be related
to general memory performance (memory control question
Experiment 1).
Similarly, if low-level perceptual cues underlay picture-referent
confusions [6] then one would expect differences in the magnitude
of the confusion errors for different iconicity levels. That is, highly
iconic pictures (i.e., photographs) should elicit more picture-object
confusion errors than drawings as these have the highest
perceptual similarity to the real-world referent and thus, share
more properties of the real-world referent. The difference from the
source-monitoring account is that no effects of memory would be
expected. Specifically, picture-object confusions should occur,
independent of the memory demands of holding the picture-object
features in memory but should emerge more frequently for
photographs than drawings.
Alternatively, if conceptual representational development un-
derlay referential confusions [14,20] then perceptual factors (i.e.,
iconicity) should have no effect and they should occur equally
likely for photographs and types of drawings. In other words, a
conceptual understanding of a current picture state and its relation
to the referent should be unaffected by how well the picture depicts
the real world.
Experiment 1
The suggestion is that younger children treat picture-referent
relationships as asymmetrical, where reality is stable and the
picture is unstable. For example, if a picture represents a doll with
a banana sticker and later the doll replaces the banana sticker with
a star, younger children are more likely to say that on the picture
the doll has now a star sticker too [7].
If children’s referential confusions are a result of difficulty
holding in mind pictorial features as distinct from the referent,
then according to the source-monitoring account [16] the degree
of resemblance of representation (i.e., iconicity) should affect
confusion. Similarly, if low-level perceptual cues drive confusion
errors then we would expect an effect of iconicity. Both accounts
would predict that children should show more referential
confusion when the picture is a photograph compared to a
colored drawing and in turn a schematic drawing. Moreover, the
source-monitoring account would predict picture-referent confu-
sions to be linked to memory performance.
Representation-Referent Confusions
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Alternatively, if conceptual representational developments
underlie referential confusions then, once the picture-object
relation is established, perceptual features (iconicity) should have
no effect.
Method
Participants. In total 205 children (101 females) took part;
74 3-year-olds (M = 3.6, SD = 4 months), 71 4-year-olds (M = 4.5,
SD = 7 months) and 60 5-year-olds, (M = 5.4, SD = 3 months).
Children were predominantly Caucasian and middle class. An
additional 11 children were excluded due to lack of attention and
experimenter error. All children were tested following written
parental consent and their own oral assent on the day of testing.
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Research
Ethics Committee at Plymouth University.
Design. Each child received 2 conditions, each consisting of
two ‘‘change doll’’ trials and two ‘‘change picture’’ trials. Each
child entered one of three iconicity conditions (photograph,
colored drawing, schematic drawing) at random.
Materials. Four doll characters (Postman Pat, Jess the cat,
two baby dolls called Sally and Lucy) and 12 colored stickers
(butterfly, apple, bus, heart, moon, cat, car, teddy, banana, boat,
dog, and flower) were used. Three stickers were used with each
doll, one of them served as distractor (see Figure 1 as an example).
In addition, pencils, coloured pens, and photographed stickers
were used to draw/put the sticker on the picture.
Procedure. In the introduction phase, children were shown
(e.g.) Sally the baby doll and, either a photograph of Sally, or
coloured drawing or schematic drawing (depending on the
iconicity condition). Then they were told, ‘‘This is a little girl
called Sally, and here are different pictures (children were shown 2
pictures of similar looking characters, one being the correct one).
Can you see the picture of Sally?’’ After the child identified the
correct picture, the experimenter said, ‘‘Yes, that’s right, that’s a
picture of Sally,’’ and the other picture was removed. All children
identified the correct picture at this stage. Then the experimenter
presented three stickers, ‘‘Look, we’ve got these stickers for Sally.
What do you see?’’ After the child’s response, Sally was given the
boat sticker: ‘‘Sally is going to put a sticker on her dress now.
Doesn’t that look nice? What is it? … Yes, you are right it’s a boat
… Sally wants us to draw her sticker on her picture (or ‘‘Sally
wants us to put a photographed sticker on the picture’’). In the
schematic drawing condition a boat sticker was drawn on the
schematic drawing with a pencil, in the colored drawing condition
a boat sticker was drawn on the colored drawing using colored
pencils. In the photograph condition a photographed boat sticker
was put on the photograph.
Then either the changed doll or changed picture trials followed.
Changed doll. The picture was faced down, and the exper-
imenter said, ‘‘Now, let’s give Sally a different sticker, let’s give her
this one instead. The boat sticker was removed and replaced by a
butterfly. ‘‘Doesn’t that look nice? What is it?’’ …Yes, it’s a
butterfly.’’ Then the doll was turned away and the test questions
were asked.
Changed item: Remember Sally (pointing briefly), what sticker is
on Sally’s t-shirt?
Unchanged item: Remember this picture (pointing briefly), what
sticker is drawn on the t-shirt?
Memory: Remember at the beginning, what sticker did we put
on Sally’s t-shirt first of all?
Children were either asked about the changed item first and the
unchanged item second and vice versa. The memory question was
always the last question. Then the second change doll trial
followed, with the same instructions but different stickers and
another character.
Changed picture. Here, the doll was faced down. The child was
told, ‘‘Now let’s draw something else in the picture, let’s draw this
instead’’, (or ‘‘Now let’s put a different sticker in the picture, let’s
take this instead.’’). The boat sticker was erased/removed and a
butterfly was drawn/put on its place. ‘‘Doesn’t that look nice?
What is it? …. Yes, that’s right it’s a butterfly’’. Then the picture
was faced down and the test questions followed.
Changed item: Remember this picture, what sticker is drawn on
the t-shirt?
Unchanged item: Remember Sally, what sticker is on Sally’s t-
shirt?
Memory: Remember when we saw the picture in the beginning,
what sticker did we draw/put on the t-shirt first of all?
This was continued with the second changed picture trial using
different stickers and another character.
Order of test questions (changed or unchanged item question
first), order of condition (change doll or change picture first) and
the puppet characters used per condition were counterbalanced
across participants.
Results and Discussion
Each child received two change doll and two change picture
trials and two memory questions, thus, scoring between 0 and 2 in
each. Mean scores for each question per condition are displayed in
table 1.
Changed Item. To examine whether it was easier to recall
what sticker was on the doll or the picture after it had been
changed, a 2 (changed item: doll vs. picture) 63 (iconicity:
photograph vs. colored drawing vs. schematic drawing) 63 (age
group: 3- vs. 4- vs. 5-year-olds) ANOVA on mean changed item
response scores was conducted where the changed item type was
the within subject variable and representation and age group were
between subjects factors.
Recall of the changed item’s original sticker was better when the
doll was changed (M = 1.3) than the picture (M = 1.1), F(1, 195)
= 8.91, p = .003, gp2 = .04. Thus, children make more errors in
answer to the question about the picture than the real-world object
(see also Robinson et al., 1994). Moreover, 3-year-olds (M = .91)
Figure 1. Postman Pat, stickers, and pictures of different
iconicity (photograph, colored drawing, schematic drawing).
Note: in Experiment 1 Postman Pat doll is shown without his bag,
whereas in Experiment 2 Postman Pat doll contained his bag.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107910.g001
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performed worse than 4-year-olds (M = 1.15, p = .015) who in turn
performed worse than 5-year-olds (M = 1.6, p,.001, LSD post-
hoc), F(2, 195) = 23.87, p,.001, gp2 = .20. Finally, recall of the
changed item was comparable across picture iconicity (photo-
graph: M = 1.28 vs. colored: M = 1.25 vs. schematic: M = 1.25),
F(2, 195) = 1.06, p..05, gp2 = .011. This finding suggests that
children are no more referentially confused the more perceptually
similar or abstracted a picture is from its current real world
referent.
Unchanged Item. To examine whether it was easier to recall
what sticker was on the unchanged doll or the picture a 2
(unchanged item: doll vs. picture) 63 (iconicity: photograph vs.
colored drawing vs. schematic drawing)63 (age group: 3- vs. 4- vs.
5-year-olds) ANOVA on mean response scores was conducted
with unchanged item type as within subject variable and the latter
two as between subjects factors.
In line with Robinson et al. [7] recall of the unchanged item’s
original sticker was better for the doll (M = 1.2) than the picture
(M = .86), F(1, 195) = 15.69, p,.001, gp2 = .074, see also [14].
Thus, the picture-object relation is asymmetrical where reality is
stable and the picture is unstable. Overall, 3-year-olds (M = .68)
performed worse than 4-year-olds (M = 1.06, p,.001) who in turn
performed worse than 5-year-olds (M = 1.32, p = .016), F(2, 195)
= 19.90, p,.001, gp2 = .17. However, both main effects were
qualified by an age x unchanged item interaction, where for both
3- and 4-year-olds recalling the doll’s sticker was easier than the
picture’s (p = .001, p,.001, respectively) but not for 5-year-olds
(p..05), F(2, 195) = 3.34, p = .038, gp2 = .033. Recall was
unaffected by iconicity (photograph: M = .97 vs. colored:
M = .97 vs. schematic: M = 1.11), F(2, 195) = 1.48, p = .231,
gp2 = .015.
Memory. In line with Robinson et al. [7] children performed
poorly on the memory question. Thus, we were unable to use it as
a control for remembering the changed items’ original features.
It was of further interest whether memory for the dolls’ and
pictures’ original features was affected by pictorial iconicity and
age. A 2 (item: doll vs. picture) 63 (iconicity: photograph vs.
colored drawing vs. schematic drawing) 63 (age group: 3 vs. 4 vs.
5) ANOVA on mean memory scores revealed main effects for age
group only, where 3-year-olds (M = .50) remembered original
features more incorrectly (p,.001) than both 4-year-olds (M = .99,
p,.001) who in turn were more incorrect than 5-year-olds
(M = 1.5, p,.001), F(2, 195) = 50.33, p,.001, gp2 = .34. There
were no other main effects (all Fs,1).
As the memory question was equally poor for both questions
referring to the original picture’s sticker and doll’s sticker whereas
performance on the changed/unchanged item was not (i.e., recall
of the doll’s sticker was easier than the picture’s), memory failure
cannot account for performance on the changed/unchanged item
questions, see also [7,30] for similar findings, posing difficulties for
a source-monitoring account. Also, in line with previous findings,
the picture-object relationship is asymmetrical where the picture is
unstable and reality is stable [7,14]. That is, children made more
errors when recalling the picture’s original sticker than the doll’s.
The picture-object confusions are difficult to explain within both
the source-monitoring framework and low-level perceptual
accounts as they would have predicted more confusion between
referent and representation the higher the degree of resemblance
(iconicity).
In sum, these findings suggest that iconicity of the pictorial
representation has little effect on picture-object referential
confusion. Once the picture-object relation is established, it is
irrelevant how well the picture represents the real world referent.
Table 1. Mean Scores (Range = 0–2) on the test and memory questions per age and condition.
Changed Item Unchanged Item Memory
3-year-olds
Schematic (N = 23) Change Doll 1.13 .78 .52
Change Picture 1.00 .96 .52
Coloured (N = 24) Change Doll .71 .37 .42
Change Picture .75 .96 .42
Photo (N = 26) Change Doll .96 .31 .58
Change Picture .88 .69 .54
4-year-olds
Schematic (N = 28) Change Doll 1.50 .93 1.21
Change Picture .89 1.39 1.11
Coloured (N = 18) Change Doll 1.06 .72 1.06
Change Picture 1.00 1.06 .61
Photo (N = 25) Change Doll 1.40 .92 .84
Change Picture 1.04 1.36 1.12
5-year-olds
Schematic (N = 23) Change Doll 1.52 1.35 1.52
Change Picture 1.43 1.30 1.26
Coloured (N = 17) Change Doll 1.82 1.24 1.47
Change Picture 1.47 1.47 1.59
Photo (N = 20) Change Doll 1.80 1.35 1.09
Change Picture 1.60 1.20 1.55
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107910.t001
Representation-Referent Confusions
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This finding may indicate that domain general representational
developments underlie referential confusion.
Experiment 2
If children accept that a photograph is of a particular real object
they tend to over-endow the photograph with visual properties of
that referent [7]. For example, if a photograph represents a teddy
without a scarf and the real teddy has a scarf, children are likely to
say that on the photograph the teddy has a scarf too [7].
In Experiment 1 the real referent changed after the picture was
developed/drawn and children had to judge whether the changed
feature appeared in the picture. In Experiment 2 the feature of the
real referent was missing from the picture from the outset and the
child had to recall whether that feature was in the picture. This
allowed focusing on the picture as distinct from its real referent
from the beginning.
Again, if source-monitoring difficulties or low-level perceptual
cues underlie referential confusions then iconicity should have an
effect. Alternatively, if conceptual representational developments
underlie referential confusion then iconicity should have no effect.
Method
Participants. In total 140 children (74 girls) took part; 69 3-
year-olds (M = 3.7, SD = 3 months), 47 4-year-olds (M = 4.4,
SD = 3 months), 24 5-year-olds (M = 5.3, SD = 3 months).
Children were predominately Caucasian and middle-class,
recruited via local schools and nurseries. They were tested
following written parental consent and their own oral assent on
the day of testing. Ethical approval for this study was obtained
from the Research Ethics Committee at Plymouth University.
Design. Each child received three iconicity trials consisting of
one schematic drawing, one accurate colored drawing and one
photograph trial. The question order, the order of the used objects
and iconicity trial order were counterbalanced across participants.
Materials. A cup and a spoon, Postman Pat and his bag, and
Lucy the baby doll and her hat were used. Each object had three
different iconicity types (schematic drawing, colored drawing and
photograph). Pictures always depicted the objects without the
extra items (e.g., Postman Pat without his bag) (Figure 1).
Procedure. First children were shown (e.g.) Lucy (doll) with
her hat and a picture of Lucy (without hat) and of a similar doll.
‘‘Can you see the picture of Lucy?’’ After the child identified the
correct picture the experimenter said, ‘‘Yes, that’s right, that’s a
picture of Lucy!’’ and the similar doll picture was removed. Then
the first control question was asked, ‘‘Look at the picture, has she
got a mouth in the picture?’’ and the picture was turned down. To
draw the child’s attention to the object, the experimenter said,
‘‘Now let’s do this’’ and lifted and replaced the hat. Then the
second control followed: ‘‘Remember the picture; has she got two
hands in the picture?’’ (pointing briefly at the picture). Finally, in
the test question children were asked: ‘‘Remember the picture; has
she got a hat in the picture?’’ (pointing briefly at the picture). In
the end the children were asked to point to Lucy’s hat.
The same procedure followed with the cup where the spoon was
missing on the picture from the outset and with Postman Pat
where his bag was missing from the outset.
Iconicity was manipulated within participant, thus, each child
received one schematic drawing, one coloured drawing and one
photograph trial. Which object appeared in which iconicity type
was counterbalanced between participants.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary Analysis. In total, 38 children (3-year-olds:
N = 21; 4-year-olds: N = 15; 5-year-olds: N = 3) failed at least one
of the 6 control questions. They were excluded from subsequent
analyses as the source of failing the test-question (memory, lack of
attention vs. picture-referent confusion) would have been difficult
to determine. However, when these children were included in the
analysis then the same result patterns emerged.
Recall of features in the representation. To examine whether
children over-endow a picture with a feature of the real object a 3
(age group: 3- vs. 4- vs. 5-year-olds) 63 (iconicity: photograph vs.
colored drawing vs. schematic drawing) ANOVA was conducted
with the former as between participants factor and the latter as
within participant variable.
Younger children were more likely to state that the picture
contained the missing feature of the real object, F(2, 98) = 6.96,
p = .001, gp2 = .12. Differences emerged between the adjacent
ages of 3 (M = .17) and 4- (M = .32, p = .074, marginally
significant) and in turn 5 years (M = .52, p = .051) (LSD-post
hoc). Iconicity had no effect (F,1, p..05) (Figure 2).
Thus, referential picture-object confusions reduce between 3-
and 5 years when the referent changes after the picture is taken/
drawn (Experiment 1) and also when the referent and the picture
are different from the outset (Experiment 2). These findings
indicate a general understanding of the relation between a picture
state and its referent develops over preschool.
However, once a picture-object relation is established, referen-
tial confusions occur independently of iconicity of the represen-
tation. Specifically, picture-object referent confusions were equally
likely to occur irrespective of whether the picture was a
photograph, a colored drawing, or a schematic drawing. Power
calculations of sample size [31] further indicated that there were
more than sufficient participants to have an 80% chance of
detecting medium sized effects. Thus, there is no evidence that
iconicity plays a role in children’s developing ability to treat a
picture in its current physical state and what it refers to [14,20].
Therefore, the current interpretation is that findings across both
experiments may reflect representational developments [22]. A
conceptual understanding of representation-referent relationship is
independent of how well a picture depicts an object or a scene.
Thus, picture-object domain general representational develop-
ments may underlie referential confusions.
As the first two experiments revealed that iconicity is not a
factor in children’s representation-referent confusions, Experiment
3 was designed to determine if children are sensitive to iconicity
per se. That is, it is necessary to rule out the possibility that
children are not affected by iconicity because they are not sensitive
to it.
Experiment 3
The aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate whether children
differentiate between levels of iconicity in establishing picture-
object relationships. Specifically, do children take into account the
degree of resemblance when matching a representation to the
correct real world referent and vice versa?
There is some indication that the degree of resemblance might
be relevant. Three- and 4-year-old children focus on surface
features when asked ‘‘what is a picture’’, for example, they
conceive pieces of paper with abstract form or even plain white
pieces of paper as a picture. In contrast, 6-8-year-olds only regard
something as a picture that represents a recognizable object [32].
This indicates a representational shift from focusing on surface
features to focusing on the representational content independent of
Representation-Referent Confusions
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the representational medium. Thus, it is likely that children in the
current experiment may focus on the level of iconicity when
matching a representation to the correct real world referent.
However, we adults see pictures ‘transparently’ - generally
directly through the picture-properties to the content. For
example, we see a picture of a famous person in the newspaper
rather than the set of coloured patches that portray the famous
person. Photographs particularly enhance this transparent per-
ception because of the high level of perceptual similarity between
the referent and the photographic image [33]. Therefore, for
children photographs may be treated as preferred representations
for reality (perceptual similarity hypothesis). Conversely, photo-
graphs may make it difficult to attend to the current picture’s state,
in comparison to other types of pictures such as drawings.
Therefore, children may be more accurate in establishing picture-
object relations the more abstracted the representation (abstracted
hypothesis). The current experiment examined how iconicity
affects children’s accuracy in matching a representation to its
according real world referent and vice versa.
Method
Participants. In total 83 children (31 girls) took part; 20 3-
year-olds (M = 3.6, SD = 4 months), 25 4-year-olds (M = 4.4,
SD = 3), 38 5-year-olds (M = 5.6, SD = 3). Children were predom-
inately Caucasian attending local nurseries and schools with a
middle class intake. All children were tested following written
parental consent and their own oral assent on the day of testing.
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Research
Ethics Committee at Plymouth University.
Design. Each child received two conditions, i) match picture
with reality and ii) match reality with picture, with a total of 6 trials.
Each child was presented with 6 target objects divided into two sets
(Set 1: Postman Pat and Bag, Green Mug and Spoon, and Baby
Doll and Hat; Set 2: Fireman Sam and Helmet, Red Cup and
Saucer, and Rag Doll and Bib). In match picture with reality, each
iconicity type (photograph, colored drawing, and schematic
drawing) was presented alongside each object. Only one acted as
the correct match to the real world referent. In match reality with
picture, each representation type was presented once alongside
three referent objects (matching object with feature present,
matching object but missing feature, and a distracter object). The
order of conditions, the order of sets and pictorial iconicity were all
counterbalanced.
Materials and Procedure. Match Picture with Reality.
Children were presented with an object with an additional feature
(e.g., Fireman Sam with his hat) and pictures of three different
iconicity types: a photo of Fireman Sam, a colored drawing of
Fireman Sam and a schematic drawing of Fireman Sam. Only one
of the picture representations (e.g., colored drawing) contained the
additional feature (i.e., helmet) and was the correct match to the
real world referent. Children were asked ‘‘Can you find the one
that matches this?’’ *points to real world object*. This was
continued with the other two objects of this set (see Figure 3 as an
example).
Children scored from 0 to 3 on the number of correct matches
made. Types of errors were also recorded (e.g., incorrectly
selecting the photo with missing features instead of correctly
selecting the schematic drawing with matching features).
Figure 2. Mean performance (Range 0–1) across age groups as a function of presentation type.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107910.g002
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Match Reality with Picture. Children were presented with a
picture iconicity type of a real world object (e.g., colored drawing
of a green mug with a spoon) in addition to three real world
objects; a matching object with feature present (green mug with a
spoon), a matching object with missing feature (exact same mug,
no spoon) and a distracter object (different mug, no spoon) (see
Table 2 for examples). Children were asked: ‘‘Find the one to
match this.’’ *Points to picture representation*. This was
continued with the other two objects of that series (i.e., Postman
Pat, Baby doll).
Children scored from 0 to 3 on the number of correct matches
made. Types of errors (e.g., selecting the object with missing
feature instead of the object with the feature present) were also
recorded.
Results and Discussion
To examine how children match pictures of different iconicity
with real world objects and vice versa, two 3 (iconicity: photograph
vs. colored drawing vs. schematic drawing)63 (age group: 3- vs. 4-
vs. 5-year-olds) ANOVAs on proportional correct match scores
were conducted where iconicity was the within participant variable
and age group the between participants factor.
Match Picture with Reality. Picture-reality match was
better when the photograph matched reality (M = .88) than both
the colored drawing (M = .50, p,.001, LSD) and the schematic
drawing (M = .38, p,.001, LSD) where the latter two did not
differ, F(2, 160) = 30.88, p,.001, gp2 = .28. Thus, additional
color information does not play a role in children’s matching of
representations with their real world referents, see also Callaghan’s
[29] Experiment 1 for similar findings when 3-year-olds match
objects to pictures. Moreover, 3-year-olds (M = .43) performed
worse than 4-year-olds (M = .60, p = .034) who in turn performed
marginally worse than 5-year-olds (M = .73, p = .057, LSD post-
hoc), F(2, 80) = 8.65, p,.001, gp2 = .18. There was no interaction
(p..05). That is, children across all ages performed best when the
picture was perceptually most similar to the real world referent.
Importantly, 3-year-olds were above chance only when the
photograph represented reality (p,.001), were at chance for the
colored drawing (p = .86) and below chance for the schematic
drawing (p = .003) (one sampled t-test: t(19) = 6.35, p,.001; t(19)
= .18, p = .86; t(19) = 23.34, p = .003; respectively). A similar
pattern was found for 4-year-olds where photograph performance
was above chance, whereas colored and schematic drawing
performances were at chance (t(24) = 8.29, p,.001; t(24) =
1.09, p = .29; t(24) = 1.47, p = .15; respectively). In contrast, 5-
year-olds performed above chance across all iconicity levels (all at
least t(37).2.7, p,.01). Thus, iconicity affected performance in
younger children more than older children.
Further, the question arises whether children have a tendency to
select the photograph per se. If so, then this should also be reflected
in the error types. Indeed, children were more likely to select the
photograph (Table 3) when it was the correct representation but
also compared to both when the colored drawing was correct
(x2 = 21.30, df = 4, p,.001) and the schematic drawing was
correct (x2 = 10.17, df = 4, p = .038). The response pattern for both
colored and schematic drawing was similar (x2 = 5.63, df = 4, p.
.05). Specifically, if children made an error they incorrectly
selected the photograph and rarely the other alternative repre-
sentation (i.e., colored vs. schematic drawing) (Table 3).
Match Reality with Picture. In contrast to above, when
children matched an object to a picture, performance was very
good overall, and it was irrelevant whether the picture was a
photograph (M = .87) or a colored drawing (M = .81), or a
schematic drawing (M = .83), F(2, 160) = 1.01, p..05, gp2 = .01.
The age improvement was significant but should be interpreted
with caution due to ceiling performance, F(2, 80) = 4.58, p = .013,
gp2 = .10. Three-year-olds (M = .73) performed worse than 5-year-
olds (M = .90, p = .004, LSD post-hoc) and both did not differ
from 4-year-olds (M = .81). Thus, matching an object to a picture
is relatively easy. Our 3-year-olds’ performance is comparable to a
previous study in which objects were matched to pictures via a
more subtle technique by placing them in a corresponding box
[29]. Matching was less successful when the picture depicted an
abstracted line drawing but did not differ when the picture
depicted an accurate line drawing, a colored drawing, or a replica
[29].
Overall, matching an object to a picture is already easy for 3-
year-olds and independent of iconicity whereas the reverse is true
for matching a picture to an object (i.e., reality). In particular,
Figure 3. Example of Match Picture with Reality set. Only one
iconicity type each matched the real-world referent (i.e., from top:
photograph, colored drawing, schematic drawing).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107910.g003








Photograph Postman Pat + Bag Postman Pat - Bag Ted Glenn - Helmet Postman Pat + Bag
Colored Drawing Baby Doll + Hat Baby Doll - Hat Different Doll - Hat Baby Doll + Hat
Schematic Drawing Green Mug + Spoon Green Mug - Spoon Red Mug -Spoon Green Mug + Spoon
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107910.t002
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young children correctly focus on object features in a represen-
tation when asked to match a picture (photograph, colored
drawing, schematic drawing) to a real-world referent. This finding
indicates that children do not require high-iconicity pictures
(perceptual similarity hypotheses) or low iconicity (abstracted
hypotheses) to establish picture-object relationships. In other
words, when there are no competing high-iconicity representations
then low iconicity is sufficient even for 3-year-olds to accurately
match pictures with objects. In contrast, young children are
sensitive to iconicity that is, biased towards photographs from a
choice of varying iconicity representations when asked to match a
picture to a real-world referent. This was reflected in matching
accuracy in both when the photograph was the correct represen-
tation, as well as error types, where children across all ages tended
to select the photograph irrespective of its correctness. Particularly,
the finding that young children tended not to notice when a
feature of the object was missing in the photograph, suggests that
the iconicity of the representation was more salient than the
individual features of the object. As previously suggested,
photographs are the easiest pictorial medium for children to
interpret the informational meaning because they are highly
perceptually similar to the real world referent [33]. Importantly,
the current results suggest that children deem photographs as best
representations from a choice of varying iconicity pictures for
establishing an object reference per se even when they lack a
salient feature of the referent.
General Discussion
It is clear that children are sensitive to how well a picture
represents an object in its current state. Findings from Experiment
3 demonstrate that children across all ages, given a set of pictures
of differing iconicity, prefer photographs as representations for the
according real world referent. Thus, the degree of resemblance
does matter in construing a picture-object relationship, suggesting
that children are sensitive to iconicity per se. This finding adds to
research that has demonstrated effects of iconicity when interpre-
tation of pictures is required. For example infants and toddlers are
more likely to imitate actions depicted in highly iconic pictures
(photographs) than less iconic ones (line drawings) [34] and are
more likely to manually explore highly iconic pictures [35].
Importantly, the current findings show that before interpreting the
meaning of pictures, iconicity is relevant in establishing a relation
between a picture and what it represents in the first place.
Interestingly, once this relationship is established, that is, once
children have accepted that a picture stands for a real world
referent, iconicity is irrelevant as demonstrated consistently across
Experiments 1 and 2. Referential confusions emerged when
changes in the object were attributed to parallel changes in the
picture (Experiment 1) and when they differed from the outset
(Experiment 2), irrespective of whether the picture was a
photograph or a colored drawing or a schematic drawing.
Could faulty source-monitoring underlie representation-referent
confusion? There is a large body of evidence showing that
children’s discrimination of sources of events increases between 4-
and 6-years [17,18,19]. Thus, developmentally this would fit into
the current pattern of age effects. Moreover, a source memory
account suggests that the higher the discriminability between
events and the more varied the perceptual details, the better the
memory and later source decision [16]. According to this, one
would have expected better performance the lower the degree of
perceptual representation-referent similarity. However, across
both Experiments 1 and 2 there was no indication of more
representation-referent confusion when the picture was a photo-
graph or a colored drawing compared to a schematic drawing.
Moreover, as shown in Experiment 1 memory was independent of
referential confusions. Further, in Experiment 2 memory demands
were kept to a minimum. That is, immediately after the picture
was faced down children were asked whether the missing feature
(e.g., spoon) was in the picture too. Taken together, the current
findings are unlikely to be explained by source-memory develop-
ments, see also Donnelly et al. [6] for similar conclusions on
referent-representation state confusions.
An alternative recent suggestion has been that children’s
picture-referent confusions emerge because they have difficulties
in seeing photographs as static representations and that changes in
the picture can ‘‘fluidly’’ affect the real-world referent [6]. This
interpretation is based on findings that changes to the picture (e.g.,
pouring water over a picture) makes 3- to 4-year-olds select the
object that matches the picture state. The suggestion is that low-
level perceptual cues drive these errors rather than children
actively believing that objects change in accordance with their
representations [6]. Although this an interesting proposition, it is
difficult to see how the current findings could be explained by a
low-level perceptual account. If it were the case that low-level
perceptual cues drove referential confusion then the current
findings should have revealed different iconicity effects. It would
be interesting to see whether Donnelly et al.’s [6] findings would
also extend if the representation were a colored or schematic
drawing.
The current findings can be better explained in terms of a
representational account [22]. Previous explanations of picture-
object referential confusion highlight children’s difficulty in
treating a picture in its current state as well as a representation
of the current real world scenario [14,20]. This by definition
requires an understanding between the representational relation-
ship between a symbol and what is refers to [9,22]. This
understanding appears to be domain general [22,23]. Evidence
for domain-generality comes from different pictorial and linguistic
phenomena requiring understanding the representational relation
between a stimulus and its interpretations. Specifically, around the
age of 4 children develop the understanding that an ambiguous
figure can have two interpretations [23,25]. This representational
pictorial understanding is related to understanding synonymy and
homonymy as well as mental representations [23,26,27,28]. The
Table 3. Response pattern (number of children) as a function of iconicity type.
Error: Photograph Error: Colored Drawing Error: Schematic Drawing Correct
Photograph ---- 5 4 74
Colored Drawing 34 ---- 4 45
Schematic Drawing 40 8 ---- 35
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107910.t003
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current findings of equal referential confusion across different
representational iconicity provide direct evidence for underlying
representational developments in picture-object confusion. In
other words, a conceptual understanding of representation-
referent relationship is independent of how well the real-world
referent is depicted by the representation.
To summarize, iconicity does matter when construing the
relationship between pictures of varying iconicity and an object. It
does not matter in understanding the relationship between a
current picture state and the real world situation it refers to. The
latter is explained by general representational developments.
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